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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in McCoy v. Louisiana1 is in many ways 
problematic.  This case dealt with a borderline-competent client waffling on 
his version of events and presented the Court an opportunity to address 
complex issues that frequently arise in similar capital cases.2  These 
tremendously important issues include: client perjury, the duty of candor, 
the rules of professional ethics, the right to withdraw, client autonomy, 
borderline competency, and mental health.3  Despite these important issues, 
the Court held a strategic concession of guilt by defense counsel was a 
structural error worthy of retrial without the showing of any prejudice.4  The 
Court favored client autonomy and set precedent that gives defendants a 
constitutional right to insist their attorneys not concede guilt to any element 
of a crime, whether facing overwhelming adverse evidence or for the 
purpose of presentence mitigation.5 
This Comment argues the Supreme Court and every applicable lower 
court erred in finding Robert McCoy competent,6 thereby enabling his 
execution.7  Due to McCoy’s behavior and mental state,8 he was not eligible 
for the death penalty,9 and the Court should have remanded on the issue of 
competency.  Additionally, the Court should have considered the issues 
mentioned above10 and given more deference to defense counsel’s strategic 
concession of guilt in light of the State’s overwhelming evidence.11  Even if 
the Court held the concession of guilt was improper, they should have then 
applied the Strickland test12 and decided if the defendant suffered prejudice 
 
1. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
2. See discussion infra Sections II–VI. 
3. See discussion infra Sections II–VI.  See generally McCoy, 138 S. Ct. 1500. 
4. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511–12. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 1506; State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535 (La. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
7. Cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (“Today, no State in the Union permits the 
execution of the insane.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“[D]eath is not a suitable 
punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”). 
8. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1513 (Alito, J., dissenting) (providing details regarding McCoy’s 
actions and proposed “incredible and uncorroborated defense”). 
9. See cases cited supra note 7. 
10. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
11. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510. 
12. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (laying out the Strickland two-
pronged test to assess “[a] convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to 
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence”). 
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stemming from the concession.13  Lastly, this Comment will discuss some 
of the issues faced by defense counsel when dealing with a perjurious or 
borderline-competent client, including the lack of guidance from the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.14 
II.    HISTORY 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees: “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”15  The right to assistance of counsel is a relatively new concept 
because the norm throughout the seventeenth and part of the eighteenth 
centuries was self-representation.16  The right to counsel stemmed from the 
framers’ intent to allow defendants to ultimately “act in their own self-
interest, free of government intervention.”17  During the mid-eighteenth 
century, however, defense counsel began to appear more frequently in court, 
although they were prohibited from speaking to the jury.18  Given most 
crimes were private in nature, defense counsel was only allowed to cross-
examine witnesses and act “as a vessel through which defendants could 
exercise their personal rights.”19  Defendants themselves were in charge of 
essentially all other parts of a criminal trial, including “speaking on issues of 
fact.”20   
Defendant self-representation is no longer the norm due to the Supreme 
Court’s shift in ideology, which began with landmark cases like Gideon v. 
 
13. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511 (“To gain redress for attorney error, a defendant ordinarily 
must show prejudice.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692)); see infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
14. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
16. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1507 (citation omitted) (“Even now, when most defendants choose 
to be represented by counsel, an accused may insist upon representing herself—however 
counterproductive that course may be.”); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975) 
(demonstrating the Sixth Amendment’s assurances, which do not merely provide the accused with a 
right to a defense but actually grant them the power to make their own personal defense); see also Erica 
J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1147, 1166 (2010) (“Although representation by counsel had become more common by the time 
of the Revolution, self-representation remained the norm.”). 
17. See Maeve Sullivan, Comment, McCoy v. Louisiana and the Perils of Client Control of the Defense, 
96 DENV. L. REV. 733, 735 (2019) (discussing the very limited role of an attorney in the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries). 
18. Id. at 735. 
19. See id. at 735–36 (discussing the limited role of an attorney in the mid-eighteenth century). 
20. See id. (describing certain duties of defense counsel and the defendant). 
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Wainwright.21  Gideon overturned the Court’s prior holding in Betts v. Brady,22 
which only gave the right to counsel to defendants charged with federal 
capital crimes such as rape or murder.23  Gideon was a landmark case in every 
aspect because it interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as “so 
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that 
it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”24  
The Gideon Court held: 
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who 
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for [them]. . . .  Similarly, there are few defendants charged with 
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare 
and present their defenses.  That government hires lawyers to prosecute and 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest 
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries.  The right of one charged with crime to counsel may 
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but 
it is in ours.25 
The Court reasoned an indigent defendant is significantly disadvantaged 
without the helping hand of counsel, and this right should not be limited to 
capital offenses, but extended to any criminal prosecution where there is a 
chance of significant jail time.26  The Gideon Court also emphasized the 
importance of having competent defense counsel because of the difficulties 
 
21. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (recognizing a constitutional right 
to counsel is not limited to federal capital offenses but is also available to state court defendants).  
22. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
23. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.  Contra Betts, 316 U.S. at 473 (holding the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not strictly require appointing trial counsel to a defendant for every criminal offense).  
24. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340–41 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465) (holding the right to counsel as a 
fundamental right which must be given to a defendant who cannot afford to hire counsel for 
themselves); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”). 
25. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
26. See id. (making the Sixth Amendment right to counsel obligatory on the States); see also 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (recognizing the need for counsels’ help in maneuvering 
through the criminal justice system); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“Because of 
the vital importance of counsel’s assistance, this Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person 
accused of a federal or state crime has the right to have counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot 
be obtained.” (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938))). 
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of maneuvering through the justice system as a layperson.27  As 
Justice Sutherland explained in Powell v. Alabama:28 “Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”29  
The Gideon and Powell Courts recognized that without an attorney’s help at 
every step of the judicial process there is simply no just or fair way to convict 
a criminal defendant.30  This is largely because, even if the accused were 
innocent, she would not have the means to prove her innocence without an 
attorney’s help.31   
The Supreme Court subtly changed its ideology when the right to self-
representation was revitalized in Faretta v. California.32  Faretta concentrated 
more on the text of the Constitution, which merely recognizes counsel as 
an assistant and reasoned that an attorney should not be forced on an 
unwilling defendant.33  The Faretta Court, in holding the Sixth Amendment 
implies a right to self-representation rather than a practice of forcing counsel 
on unwilling defendants in a criminal proceeding, favored autonomy and 
relied on the roots of English legal history.34 
In the 1980s, following Faretta, the Court further accentuated its shift 
toward defendants’ rights in Jones v. Barnes.35  In Jones, the Supreme Court 
held: counsel has the authority to make strategic decisions when defending 
a client, but the client controls the objectives of the defense.36  Additionally, 
 
27. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337–39, 344–45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69) (overturning the 
Court’s previous holding in Betts because of the Court’s realization that the refusal to appoint counsel 
is offensive to the idea of fairness). 
28. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
29. Id. at 69. 
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); 
see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (deeming the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “fundamental”); 
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69 (recognizing the danger a lay defendant may encounter without help from 
counsel in navigating the criminal justice system). 
31. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (“Without [the help of counsel], though he be not guilty, he faces 
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”). 
32. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975) (using a strict interpretation of the 
Constitution to hold the Sixth Amendment guarantees “the assistance of counsel” and does not require 
an attorney to be forced on an unwilling defendant). 
33. See id. at 817, 820 (“We confront here a nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people 
as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to 
defend himself if he truly wants to do so.”). 
34. Id. at 819–21. 
35. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (affirming the defendant has the authority to 
make many decisions regarding certain aspects of his case, including whether to represent himself). 
36. See id. at 751 (“[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental 
decisions regarding the case . . . .”); see also Brief for the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae 
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the Court emphasized: counsel does not have a duty to press every 
nonfrivolous argument the client requests “if counsel, as a matter of 
professional judgement, decides not to present those points.”37  The 
Supreme Court “rationalized that these defined roles would afford counsel 
sufficient flexibility in forming the defense, as experienced advocates are 
often better equipped to determine which issues will offer the defendant the 
greatest chance of success.”38   
In 1984, the Supreme Court offered further protections for criminal 
defendants in Strickland v. Washington.39  Strickland provided a mode of 
recourse for defendants whose attorneys “fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.”40  Strickland’s two-pronged standard provides: if a 
defendant can show (1) his attorney fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) as a result he was prejudiced, the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial—or alternatively a new sentencing proceeding—on 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.41  The recourse provided 
under Strickland is frequently raised on appeal in both state and federal 
courts but hardly ever granted.42  To date, the Supreme Court has failed to 
 
Supporting Petitioner at 4–5, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (No. 16-8255) (“Nowhere 
do the rules of ethics suggest that the prospect of false testimony entitles the lawyer to affirmatively 
disparage his client’s case in court against his express wishes.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives 
of representation . . . .  In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the 
client will testify.”). 
37. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751 (explaining, while a defendant has the ultimate authority regarding 
certain aspects of his case, he does not have a constitutional right to force appointed counsel to pursue 
nonfrivolous claims). 
38. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 737–38; see Jones, 463 U.S. at 751–52 (recognizing experienced 
attorneys have long emphasized the importance of narrowing the scope of arguments and focusing on 
a few key issues that are likely to succeed). 
39. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
40. Id. at 688. 
41. See id. at 687–88 (explaining the necessary components to support a defendant’s claim that 
the court should reverse his conviction or death penalty on the basis that his counsel’s assistance was 
defective). 
42. See Meredith J. Duncan, “Lucky” Adnan Syed: Comprehensive Changes to Improve Criminal Defense 
Lawyering and Better Protect Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1651, 1652–53 (2017) 
(“[T]he failure rate of ineffective assistance claims does not accurately reflect the frequency with which 
defendants receive unacceptable legal representation at trial.”); Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL. W.L. REV. 237, 259 (1995) (demonstrating 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are granted at a rate of less than 1% in federal courts and less 
than 10% in state courts); Nancy J. King, Essay, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE 
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recognize the inadequacy of existing ineffective assistance of counsel 
jurisprudence.43 
The Supreme Court had yet another opportunity in McCoy to address how 
to balance a client’s interest with the attorney’s interest in using his 
professional judgment.44  McCoy represented the difficult position often met 
by capital defense counsel dealing with a borderline-competent client facing 
the most extreme criminal charges.45  This case was an excellent 
opportunity for the Court to clear many ambiguities in capital cases, 
especially cases involving a fundamental disagreement regarding trial 
strategy and the concession of guilt.46 
III.    FACTS OF MCCOY V. LOUISIANA 
On May 5, 2008, Christine Young and her husband, Willie Young, were 
shot dead in their home in Bossier City, Louisiana.47  Christine’s grandson, 
Gregory Colston—only a high school senior—was also shot and killed in 
the same incident.48  After quick investigative work and cooperation 
between the state and federal police, Robert McCoy (“McCoy”) was arrested 
and charged with three counts of first-degree murder.49  On July 1, 2008, 
the State of Louisiana “gave its notice of intent to seek the death penalty 
against [McCoy].”50  
The physical and circumstantial evidence obtained by the State of 
Louisiana was overwhelming.51  First, the State had police dashboard 
footage of McCoy fleeing the scene of the crime in his car, a white Kia 
registered to him and the daughter of the victims, Yolonda Colston.52  
 
L.J. 2428, 2431 (2013) (emphasis added) (describing “the notoriously low rate of relief in federal habeas 
[claims,] . . . [stating] less than 1% of noncapital habeas petitions were granted for any claim”). 
43. Duncan, supra note 42, at 1653. 
44. See generally McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (avoiding modification of the 
existing approach to defendant autonomy). 
45. See discussion infra Section V.B. 
46. See discussion infra Part VI. 
47. State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 541 (La. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 541–44 (describing the manhunt for McCoy involving local police, the U.S. 
Marshals, and the FBI resulting in his arrest and subsequent indictment for capital murder). 
50. Id. at 544. 
51. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1513 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The evidence 
against [McCoy] was truly ‘overwhelming,’ as the Louisiana Supreme Court aptly noted.” (citing McCoy, 
218 So. 3d at 565)). 
52. See McCoy, 218 So. 3d at 542 (“Detective Humphrey cautioned the first responders to be on 
the lookout for a white four-door Kia, which he believed was driven by Robert McCoy.”). 
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Second, Yolonda had separated from McCoy earlier that spring and was in 
protective custody after an incident of domestic abuse.53  Next, the police 
received a distressed 911 call from one of the victims, in which she 
screamed: “She ain’t here, Robert [McCoy] . . . I don’t know where she is.  
The detectives have her.  Talk to the detectives.  She ain’t in there, Robert 
[McCoy].”54  A gunshot then rang out and the call disconnected.55  The 
phone used to place the 911 call was later found inside the white Kia McCoy 
abandoned during the police chase.56  Also inside the Kia was ammunition 
for the gun used to kill the victims and a receipt documenting an 
ammunition purchase earlier that day. 57  The State obtained security camera 
footage from Walmart, showing McCoy purchasing the ammunition.58  
Further, the State had cell phone records placing McCoy in Bossier City on 
the day of the murders, negating his assertion of being out of state when the 
murders occurred.59  The next piece of damning evidence obtained by the 
State was the murder weapon, which officers found on McCoy at the time 
of his arrest; the State ran a ballistics test on the weapon, confirming it was 
the same gun that killed the three victims.60  The gun, bullets, and 
ammunition found in the white Kia were identical to the bullet casings 
found at the scene of the crime.61   
 
53. See id. at 541 (footnote omitted) (“Yolanda Colston[] had separated from [McCoy] earlier in 
the [s]pring of 2008 and following an incident of domestic abuse battery in April 2008. . . .  Yolanda 
and her infant daughter had gone into protective custody out-of-state, and a warrant was issued, on 
April 16, 2008, for [McCoy’s] arrest for aggravated battery . . . .”). 
54. Id. at 541–42.  
55. Id. at 542. 
56. Id.  
57. See id. at 542, 544 n.8 (“Also found in the center console of the abandoned Kia was a 
Walmart bag with a box of .380 caliber ammunition.  Inside the Walmart bag was a cash receipt from 
earlier that same day . . . for the purchase of the ammunition.”). 
58. See id. (footnote omitted) (“The police obtained video surveillance footage from Walmart, 
generated at the time of the purchase on the receipt, which showed an individual matching the 
defendant’s physical description purchasing ammunition while wearing a black ‘do-rag’ on []his head.”). 
59. See id. at 541, 549 n.15 (“[McCoy’s] cell phone records indicated that he returned to Bossier 
City on or about May 4, 2008, as calls were initiated from [McCoy’s] cell phone in Bossier and Caddo 
Parishes on the day of, and the day after, the murders.”). 
60. See id. at 543–44, 544 n.8 (“[T]he bullet that killed Willie Young, which was removed from 
his brain during autopsy, was fired from [the gun], and all four cartridge casings found at the scene 
at 19 Grace Lane were conclusively determined to have been fired from [the gun].”). 
61. Id. at 544 n.8. 
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Despite this evidence, McCoy insisted he was innocent and was not in 
Louisiana at the time of the murders.62  Instead, McCoy swore corrupt 
police shot the victims when a drug deal went sour, and the government was 
trying to frame him for the murders.63  McCoy was certain the police were 
involved in a massive drug ring conspiracy, which included the federal 
government, his defense attorney, and even the presiding judge.64   
As the Supreme Court noted: 
Despite all this evidence, [McCoy], who had been found competent to stand 
trial and had refused to plead guilty by reason of insanity, insisted that he did 
not kill the victims.  [McCoy] claimed that the victims were killed by the local 
police and that he had been framed by a farflung conspiracy of state and 
federal officials, reaching from Louisiana to Idaho.  [McCoy] believed that 
even his attorney and the trial judge had joined the plot.65 
When it came time for trial, McCoy insisted his defense counsel 
(hereinafter “English”) not concede guilt as to any element of the charged 
offense, believing he was innocent of any wrongdoing.66  Although English 
reasonably believed the best way to avoid the death penalty was to concede 
guilt to the murders and argue McCoy lacked the mental state requisite for 
first-degree murder, McCoy disagreed and insisted English put on the 
farfetched conspiracy defense and pursue acquittal.67  English—aware that 
pursuing such a defense would be madness for his client—conceded guilt 
over McCoy’s objection, believing this was truly the best strategy to maintain 
 
62. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1506 (2018) (describing McCoy’s insistence he was 
not in the State of Louisiana at the time of the murders). 
63. See id. at 1506 (“[McCoy] insistently maintained he was out of State at the time of the killings 
and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong.”). 
64. See id. at 1513 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing McCoy’s belief his attorney and federal 
officials were involved in the plot). 
65. Id.  
66. See id. at 1506 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (“McCoy told English ‘not to make 
that concession,’ and English knew of McCoy’s ‘complet[e] oppos[ition] to [English] telling the jury 
that [McCoy] was guilty of killing the three victims’; instead of any concession, McCoy pressed English 
to pursue acquittal.”). 
67. See id. at 1506 & n.1 (describing English’s plan to concede guilt and argue for a lesser 
offense); Jeffery C. Mays, To Try to Save Client’s Life, a Lawyer Ignored His Wishes.  Can He Do That?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/nyregion/mccoy-louisiana-lawyer-
larry-english.html [https://perma.cc/PTG9-PKQ8] (“Mr. English said it was Mr. McCoy’s delusions 
of a grand conspiracy that made his client unable to participate in his defense and that led him to 
believe he had no choice but to try to save his client’s life.”). 
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credibility with the jury and spare his client’s life.68  Mr. English explained 
his position in a post-trial affidavit stating: 
I [knew] that [McCoy] was completely opposed to me telling the jury that he 
was guilty of killing the three victims and telling the jury that he was crazy but 
I believed that this was the only way to save his life. . . .  I felt that as long as 
I was his attorney of record it was my ethical duty to do what I thought was 
best to save his life even though what he wanted me to do was to get him 
acquitted in the guilt phase. . . .  I firmly believe that Robert McCoy is insane 
and was not competent to be tried . . . .69 
McCoy’s actions demonstrated the extremely difficult hand dealt to English 
in this case.70  English could either concede guilt—giving McCoy a fighting 
chance at life in prison instead of a capital verdict—or do what the Supreme 
Court now says is required and walk his client into the government’s “death 
chamber.”71   
The Supreme Court noted: “English harbored no doubt that McCoy 
believed what he was saying, . . . English simply disbelieved McCoy’s 
account in view of the prosecution’s evidence.”72  In light of this fact, the 
Court incorrectly held English could not have violated the rules of ethics or 
committed perjury because he did not actually know his client was lying.73  
 
68. See State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d at 565–66 (portraying a post-trial affidavit from Mr. English 
that states his concern with maintaining credibility with the jury; see also Steward v. Grace, No. 04-3587, 
2007 WL 2571448, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2007) (“This is an established technique whereby a criminal 
defendant, in order to enhance his credibility with the jury, concedes guilt in the liability phase in order 
to more effectively persuade the jury to show leniency at sentencing.”).  But see People v. Bergerud, 
223 P.3d 686, 691 (Colo. 2010) (“Although defense counsel is free to develop defense theories based 
on reasonable assessments of the evidence, as guided by her professional judgment, she cannot usurp 
those fundamental choices given directly to criminal defendants by the United States and Colorado 
Constitutions.”). 
69. McCoy, 218 So. 3d at 565 (third omission in original).  
70. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1512 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The real case is far more complex.  
Indeed, the real situation English faced at the beginning of petitioner’s trial was the result of a freakish 
confluence of factors that is unlikely to recur.”). 
71. See id. at 1514 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (“As English observed, taking that 
path would have only ‘help[ed] the District Attorney send [petitioner] to the death chamber.’”). 
72. Id. at 1510; see also Mays, supra note 67 (“About a month before the trial, Mr. English told 
Mr. McCoy that the case was unwinnable because of the evidence the prosecution had against him, 
including that when Mr. McCoy was discovered, the gun used in the killings was under a seat of the 
vehicle he was traveling in.”). 
73. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510 (“English simply disbelieved McCoy’s account in view of the 
prosecution’s evidence. . . .  Louisiana’s ethical rules might have stopped English from 
presenting McCoy’s alibi evidence if English knew perjury was involved.  But Louisiana has identified 
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This distinction is farfetched and undermines the difficult position defense 
counsel faces when dealing with this type of defendant.74  Additionally, the 
Court’s opinion strangely acknowledged McCoy was ruled competent to 
stand trial and be executed, barely glazing over the facts that (1) McCoy truly 
believed he was out of the state at the time he killed three innocent people 
and (2) was convinced the government (including the trial judge) was trying 
to frame him in a massive conspiracy.75  On appeal, McCoy argued English 
violated his constitutional right to counsel when English conceded guilt over 
McCoy’s consistent objections.76  The Supreme Court agreed, going as far 
as ruling such a concession a structural error—meaning there is no need to 
show prejudice and the error automatically entitled McCoy to a new trial.77   
IV.    CLIENT PERJURY AND THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW  
The first argument of this Comment will focus on when an attorney can 
withdraw from a case, particularly when the attorney believes her client will 
commit perjury.78  Perjury occurs when “[a] witness testifying under oath 
or affirmation . . . gives false testimony concerning a material matter with 
the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.”79  The Supreme Court has not 
clarified what amounts to knowledge of a client’s intent to commit perjury, 
which would potentially justify counsel’s withdrawal.  Unfortunately, 
caselaw and the rules of professional conduct also do not clarify or define 
 
no ethical rule requiring English to admit McCoy’s guilt over McCoy’s objection.”).  But see MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so 
that is not frivolous . . . .”); Id. at R. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . make a false statement of 
fact or law to a tribunal . . . [or] offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”); Id. at R. 8.5(a) (“A 
lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, 
regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.”). 
74. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1513 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[P]etitioner and English were stuck with 
each other, and petitioner availed himself of his right to take the stand to tell his wild story.  Under 
those circumstances, what was English supposed to do?”). 
75. See id. (“[P]etitioner, who had been found competent to stand trial and had refused to plead 
guilty by reason of insanity, insisted that he did not kill the victims.  He claimed that the victims were 
killed by the local police and that he had been framed by a farflung conspiracy of state and federal 
officials . . . .”). 
76. State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 550 (La. 2016). 
77. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511–12. 
78. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (stating when an attorney must and may 
withdraw from representing a client—a lawyer must attempt to withdraw if the client insists on a course 
of conduct that would violate the Rules, which includes committing perjury). 
79. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). 
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what amounts to actual knowledge, although the rules do provide that 
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.80  To add to the 
confusion, different courts use different standards for concluding what 
amounts to the attorney knowing his client’s testimony will be perjurious.81  
Courts have used multiple standards, including: (1) “good cause to believe 
the defendant’s proposed testimony would be deliberately untruthful,”82 
(2) “knowledge ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’”83 (3) “a firm factual basis,”84 
(4) “a ‘good-faith determination,’”85 and (5) “actual knowledge.”86   
Keeping all of these standards in mind, it seems obvious that—regardless 
of what standard is used—when the evidence is overwhelming and the 
client’s only defense is blaming the government for three homicides in a 
drug deal gone south, an attorney can certainly use his professional 
judgment in deciding whether or not this story is true, and whether or not 
there is evidence to corroborate such an accusation.87  It would be 
 
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (defining “knowingly” and stating “[a] 
person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances”); see also State v. Chambers, 
994 A.2d. 1248, 1259 (Conn. 2010) (“[O]ur Rules of Professional Conduct require ‘actual knowledge’ 
and not a mere ‘reasonable belief’ by the attorney that his client intends to commit perjury.”); Att’y U 
v. The Miss. Bar, 678 So. 2d 963, 970 (Miss. 1996) (citation omitted) (“The Terminology section of the 
Rules does not define ‘knowledge’ but it does define similar terms.  ‘Knowingly,’ ‘Known[,’] or ‘Knows’ 
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question.  A person’s knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstances.  Nowhere, however, is ‘actual knowledge’ defined.”). 
81. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1246–47 (Mass. 2003) (discussing some 
of the many different standards used by courts across the nation). 
82. See State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6, 11 (Iowa 2002) (“Hischke satisfied the requisite 
standard that a lawyer must be ‘convinced with good cause to believe the defendant’s proposed 
testimony would be deliberately untruthful.’”). 
83. See Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1379 (Del. 1989) (“[A]n attorney should have 
knowledge ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ before he can determine under Rule 3.3 that his client has 
committed or is going to commit perjury.  This standard of knowledge is necessary to allow the attorney 
to represent the client zealously while remaining true to the judicial system.”). 
84. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) (“If an attorney 
faced with this situation were in fact to discuss with the Trial Judge his belief that his client intended 
to perjure himself, without possessing a firm factual basis for that belief, he would be violating the duty 
imposed upon him as defense counsel.”). 
85. See People v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (applying a “good-faith 
determination” standard as adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court (citing People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d 
481 (Ill. 1989))). 
86. See United States v. Del Carpio-Cotrina, 733 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“However, 
we do agree that a lawyer’s duty to disclose future crimes or fraud by the client depends on the lawyer’s 
state of knowledge.  In short, actual knowledge is required.”). 
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1247–48 (Mass. 2003) (giving 
deference to trial counsel with thirty-five years of experience to use professional judgment in spotting 
client perjury). 
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unrealistic to reach any other conclusion but falsity given the evidence the 
State had against McCoy and McCoy’s accusations.  The lower courts erred 
in not allowing English to withdraw, or alternatively not allowing McCoy to 
proceed by himself if he wanted to put on a defense that his attorney firmly 
believed was fraudulent.88 
A. How the McCoy Holding Affects the Legal Profession 
With the ruling in McCoy, defense attorneys—especially those who handle 
capital crimes—will be discouraged from taking these already immensely 
complex life or death cases.89  Taking capital cases is a demanding and 
emotional task for any lawyer, but when the lines get blurred with opinions 
like McCoy, attorneys will not want to put their reputations—including their 
professional disciplinary reputations—at risk to take these cases.90  All 
attorneys who are able and willing should take capital cases and fight to save 
the client’s life.91  But attorneys will not do this when the rules for capital 
punishment proceedings are so unclear, and caselaw from the Supreme 
Court only adds to the perplexity.92  Moreover, higher courts pick apart 
professional trial strategy at every turn, causing capital defense attorneys—




88. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1513 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“English told 
petitioner ‘some eight months’ before trial that the only viable strategy was to admit the killings and to 
concentrate on attempting to avoid a sentence of death. . . .  [P]etitioner could have discharged English 
and sought new counsel willing to pursue his conspiracy defense . . . .”).  
89. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Should There Be a Specialized Ethics Code for Death-Penalty Defense 
Lawyers?, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527, 533 (2016) (“The unusual nature and vulnerability of the 
clientele—individuals, many with mental impairments, whose lives are on the line—leads to particular 
challenges of decision-making and counseling.”). 
90. See, e.g., id. at 533–34 (footnote omitted) (“Death penalty defense is complex and 
demanding, and the quality of the defense matters to the outcome.”). 
91. See, e.g., CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION Standard 4-1.2(e) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunction 
FourthEdition/ [https://perma.cc/R2XH-CW4Z] (stating, generally, defense counsel should actively 
contribute to the administration of justice and to improving the law and criminal justice system as a 
whole). 
92. See Mays, supra note 67 (“We are looking for guidance.  This area of the law is ripe with 
ambiguity and mistakes . . . .”). 
93. See Representation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-
issues/death-penalty-representation [https://perma.cc/5LQA-DYGE] (indicating “most states have 
raised the standards for representation,” but many counties lack resources for providing adequate 
representation in a capital case). 
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In fact, attorney Larry English never practiced law again after taking the 
McCoy case because he “went into a deep depression,” and knew that “[he] 
could never put [himself] through that again, emotionally.”94 
Larry English had dedicated his life and criminal law practice to help fight 
injustice in the United States.95  Mr. English, who grew up poor in rural 
Louisiana with six siblings, beat the odds and graduated from Tulane Law 
School.96  When given the chance to represent McCoy, English saw the 
opportunity “as part of a larger struggle against injustice” in the United 
States.97  English was dedicated to making a real change in our system, 
which “is so racked by racism and classism that there is no way the death 
penalty can be implemented in a way that’s constitutional.”98  During the 
McCoy case, English frequently spoke to his friend Bridgett Brown, a lawyer 
friend of nearly two decades.99  Ms. Brown had tried three capital cases in 
the past and described the situation as English having the “job nobody 
wanted.”100  Unfortunately, English has now retired from practicing law, 
and another warrior in our justice system is lost due to a broken system that 
will not face difficult issues head on.101  
It is certainly not desirable to run attorneys out of the business—
especially those dedicated to changing the system.  When a citizen’s life is at 
stake and terrible crimes have been committed, the most competent 
attorneys are necessary to ensure the end result is just, and due process is 
afforded at every step.  With the help of the Supreme Court and the ABA, 
this can be done by making the rules clear and through guiding attorneys 
instead of second-guessing their professional decisions.  
 
94. See Mays, supra note 67 (detailing English’s reaction to the McCoy case). 
95. See id. (“All these lives are coming in, and you are doing everything you can to save them.  
It was my way of fighting the system.”). 
96. See id. (“Mr. English, who is 62, grew up poor with six siblings on a sharecropper’s farm in 
rural Louisiana.  [English] said he had ‘a better chance of being the starting point guard for the New 





101. See id. (explaining lawyers are in need of guidance and clarification in this area of the law). 
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B. Potential Solutions to the McCoy Problem 
The first proposed solution to the McCoy dilemma is a specialized code 
for death penalty litigation.102  This code would set specific rules for 
litigators encountering tough issues that frequently arise in death penalty 
cases.103  This specialized code could include a separate code of 
professional responsibility and ethics that would guide attorneys who are 
forced to work with a client who is committing perjury or insisting on a 
bizarre defense objective.  This seems like a dramatic course of action—
especially because it could potentially flood the courts with other specialized 
attorneys arguing for a specialized code within their area of law—but it 
seems reasonable and necessary for death penalty litigation.104  The death 
penalty case is a truly particular area of the law, as it uniquely involves life 
or death.105  Thus, the need for a specialized set of rules is crucial.  As one 
commentator explained: 
[T]here are areas of professional conduct where lawyers—particularly those 
working in specialized legal practices—do not have adequate guidance about 
how to resolve ethics problems.  These lawyers face disciplinary and other 
legal risks because of the vagueness, uncertainty, or incompleteness of the 
ethics rules. . . .  Ideally, the problem would be addressed by additional, clearer 
rules that are tailored to the relevant areas . . . .106 
Of course, a better solution would be for the Court to address the 
perjurious client issue, which arises with defendants like Robert McCoy.  
This would not be an easy task, but it is one important enough to be 
necessary.   
The Supreme Court could have initiated this resolution by clearly defining 
what amounts to knowledge of perjury.  It is unclear what constitutes 
 
102. See Green, supra note 89, at 532–34 (explaining why capital defense differs significantly 
from other types of criminal cases and involve frequent ethical issues that need to be addressed swiftly 
and accurately). 
103. See id. (“If there are areas of practice where generalized ethics rules provide insufficient 
guidance, one might assume that death penalty defense is one of them.”) 
104. See id. at 534 (explaining death penalty defense cases often involve particularly distinct and 
important ethical problems that require wise solutions).  But see id. at 534–35 (addressing some of the 
potential pitfalls, including objections from other attorneys and judges who deal with specialized issues, 
in adopting a specialized code). 
105. See id. at 534 (“[D]eath penalty defense would seem to be an area of practice where it is 
especially important for lawyers to resolve ethics problems appropriately, and where lawyers would 
need more guidance than usual in determining how to reach adequate resolutions.”). 
106. Id. at 556.  
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knowledge of a client’s intent to commit perjury, and cases are conflicting 
on the issue.107  The Supreme Court has held defense counsel must know 
their client is going to commit perjury before they may withdraw; but how 
does one ever truly know—without a shadow of doubt—what his client is 
saying is not true?  Is absolutely no evidence to corroborate the client’s 
version of the facts enough?108  Is it enough if the client merely changes 
her story before trial?109  Is it enough if the attorney is almost certain the 
client is fabricating her story because she has nothing to live for?  
One such case on the issue includes Nix v. Whiteside,110 in which the 
Supreme Court held: “An attorney’s duty of confidentiality . . . does not 
extend to a client’s announced plans to engage in . . . criminal conduct.”111  
The Court in Nix held “an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court,” should 
be “dedicated to a search for truth,” and the right to counsel does not 
include the right to have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned 
perjury.112  In fact, the Court stated if a lawyer does cooperate in such 
conduct, he would risk suspension and disbarment from the practice of 
law.113  However, the Court does not provide guidance on what constitutes 
knowledge of a client’s intent to commit perjury.114  The client in Nix 
actually manifested his intent to commit perjury by telling his attorney 
directly that he intended to testify falsely and claim he saw a gun because he 
 
107. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 160–61 (1986) (indicating when a defendant changes 
his story right before trial, defense counsel has enough evidence to know her client is going to perjure 
himself).  But see United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2003) (declaring the 
defendant’s “mystery man did it” story, although lacking any corroboration, was not enough to know 
the defendant was lying). 
108. See generally McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (demonstrating an instance in 
which the defendant’s version of the facts was wholly uncorroborated); Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (providing 
another instance in which the defendant’s version of the facts is uncorroborated and uncredible). 
109. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 160–61 (demonstrating an instance in which the defendant’s story was 
consistent up until the eve of trial). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 174 (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)). 
112. See id. at 174 (“[T]he responsibility of an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court and a key 
component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for truth, is essentially the same whether the 
client announces an intention to bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors or to commit or procure 
perjury.”). 
113. See id. at 173 (“A lawyer who would so cooperate would be at risk of prosecution for 
suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings, including suspension or disbarment.”). 
114. See generally id. (failing to specify when an attorney knows a client intends to perjure 
himself). 
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believed if he did not he was “dead.”115  However, these types of express 
concessions are rare.   
For example, in United States v. Midgett,116 the defendant was charged with 
damaging a vehicle with fire and injuring another, bank robbery, and 
threatening a bank teller with gasoline.117  Midgett and his lawyer were at 
odds from the outset of the case.118  Among other things, Midgett was not 
satisfied with his lawyer’s unwillingness to pursue a “‘third person’ 
defense.”119  According to Midgett, there was a third person involved who 
committed the assaults while Midgett himself was “in a drug-induced sleep 
in the back of the vehicle.”120  Unfortunately for Midgett, there was 
absolutely no corroborating evidence to support his “third person” 
theory.121  As Midgett’s attorney stated on the record: “[T]he issue relates 
to whether or not a third person was at the scene at the time of the 
destruction incident when [the victim] was burned, a third person actually 
did the act. . . .  There’s nothing whatsoever that I can find to corroborate 
any such representation.”122 
The court in Midgett distinguished these facts from Nix and held  
the attorney did not actually know that his client was going to commit 
perjury.123  The court stated Midgett had been consistent with his  
story and his lawyer’s responsibility to him did not depend on the  
quantity of proof in favor of or contrary to Midgett’s version of the  
 
115.  
Whiteside consistently stated to [counsel] that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was 
convinced that [the victim] had a gun in his hand.  About a week before trial . . . Whiteside for 
the first time told [counsel] and his associate Donna Paulsen that he had seen something 
“metallic” in [the victims] hand.  When asked about this, Whiteside responded: “[I]n 
Howard Cook’s case there was a gun.  If I don’t say I saw a gun, I’m dead.” 
See id. at 160–61 (fifth alteration in original).  
116. United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003). 
117. Id. at 322. 
118. Id. 
119. See id. (“According to Midgett, it was [his co-accused’s] friend, and not Midgett, who had 
committed the assault . . . while Midgett lay in a drug-induced sleep in the back of the vehicle. . . .  
[Midgett’s] lawyer did not want Midgett to take the stand because he did not believe Midgett’s version 
of events.”). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 323. 
122. Id. 
123. See id. at 325–26 (distinguishing the facts of the case from those in Nix). 
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facts.124  The court recognized this “mystery man did it” story lacked 
corroboration but found persuasive the fact Midgett never changed his story 
and never admitted he intended to commit perjury.125  The court stated—
quite comically—that “[d]efense counsel’s mere belief, albeit a strong one 
supported by other evidence, was not a sufficient basis to refuse Midgett’s 
need for assistance in presenting his own testimony.”126  
Courts ought to give defense counsel a lot of deference in these situations 
because, other than the client themselves, counsel is in the best position to 
know whether her client is lying or telling the truth.  Defense counsel works 
directly with the client and has access to all the facts, including those that 
are confidential.  Thus, when defense counsel wants to withdraw from a 
case because she is quite certain her client is committing perjury, she ought 
to not be challenged by the court or have her “belief, albeit a strong one” 
questioned by judges who have not been working directly with the client 
and likely have no experience working with criminal clients.127  When 
courts publish opinions like the one in Midgett, they create a situation where 
defense counsel, who are already in a difficult situation, must potentially put 
their reputations and license at risk for a client who insists on a potentially 
frivolous defense with no corroborating evidence.128  Furthermore, 
defenses like this are comical for a jury because jurors are not incompetent 
and know when a defendant is reaching in an effort to escape prison. 
  
 
124. See id. at 326 (“Defense counsel’s responsibility to his client was not dependent on whether 
he personally believed Midgett, nor did it depend on the amount of proof supporting or contradicting 
Midgett’s anticipated testimony regarding how the incident happened.”). 
125. See id. at 325–26 (“Midgett consistently maintained that his third-person defense was true 
and that he believed his co-defendant could corroborate his story.”). 
126. Id. at 326. 
127. See id. at 326 (stating although counsel’s belief of perjury was very strong, it was not enough 
to know his client intended to commit perjury).  But see People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (explaining a potential downside to allowing counsel to withdraw is that the client 
could now find another attorney who lacks ethical standards who may help the client defraud the 
court).  
128. See Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the Unabomber, 
24 VT. L. REV. 417, 528 (2000) (“For the capital defense lawyer, issues of ethics are neither theoretical 
nor abstract.  How he or she addresses these issues will drive virtually every aspect of how the client’s 
case will be investigated and litigated.”); see also Michael S. McGinniss, The Character of Codes: Preserving 
Spaces for Personal Integrity in Lawyer Regulation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 559, 566 (2016) (“The most 
fundamental reason to exercise restraint when imposing specific mandates in lawyer regulation is to 
create space for individual lawyers to integrate their personal, moral, and religious convictions with 
their professional lives.”). 
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C. How McCoy Affects Trial Strategy and Using the Narrative Approach to 
Avoid Attorney Discipline 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in McCoy also makes problems worse in terms 
of credibility with the court and jury.129  If English did put on the 
implausible conspiracy defense, he would have lost all credibility and the 
trial would have been a circus full of meritless accusations.130  Furthermore, 
by putting on a fruitless defense, English would be subject to discipline for 
perjuring the court and bringing claims with no corroborating evidence.131   
A potential way around discipline would be through a specialized death 
penalty code, addressed above, which would provide attorneys with 
breathing room when dealing with these types of clients.132  Another 
solution proposed for situations when an attorney has a perjurious client is 
to use the narrative approach; however, that approach has been criticized 
and raises further issues that the Court should have addressed in McCoy.133 
1. The Narrative Approach and Pitfalls Associated with this Approach 
Although it is well established attorneys may not assist their clients in 
committing perjury, nothing stops them from allowing their clients to get 
on the stand and tell their story without guidance.134  This is the “narrative 
approach,” which allows the defendant to tell her side of the story without 
 
129. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1515 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Endorsing 
petitioner’s bizarre defense would have been extraordinarily unwise . . . .”); see also State v. McCoy, 
218 So. 3d 535, 565 (La. 2016) (“I needed to maintain my credibility with the jury in the penalty phase 
and could not do that if I argued in the guilt phase that he was not in Louisiana at the time of the 
killings, as he insisted.”) 
130. As we have seen before in the famous Unabomber case, allowing unrealistic accusations 
to freely come into court can create a chaotic environment: 
[Judge Burrell] understandably developed a strong desire to avoid the chaos, legal and otherwise, 
that would have ensued had Kaczynski been allowed to present his twisted theories to a jury as 
his defense to a capital murder charge.  Not only would such a trial have had a circus atmosphere 
but, in light of Kaczynski’s aversion to mitigating evidence, it would in all likelihood have resulted 
in his execution. 
United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). 
131. See sources cited supra note 73. 
132. See supra Section IV.B. and accompanying footnotes. 
133. See infra Section IV.C.1 and accompanying footnotes. 
134. See People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Under the narrative 
approach, the attorney calls the defendant to the witness stand but does not engage in the usual 
question and answer exchange.  Instead, the attorney permits the defendant to testify in a free narrative 
manner.”). 
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it being in question and answer form like a typical direct examination.135  
However, this approach is problematic because it is well known that it is 
only used when an attorney believes his client is committing perjury.136  
Thus, the attorney is essentially selling out his client and also tainting his 
own defense.137  Likewise, if even one juror knows this method is only used 
when the attorney believes his client is committing perjury,138 the whole 
jury pool could potentially be tainted, and the case will almost certainly be 
lost.  Moreover, the attorney is portraying his client as a liar and as someone 
who disregards the oath and the law to the judge and prosecutor who know 
very well why the approach is being used.139   
This unfavorable solution is even more problematic because the 
defendant is subject to cross-examination and is effectively ruining her 
credibility on the stand without her attorney’s guidance.  Furthermore, when 
telling a story without the guidance of an experienced trial attorney, the 
version of events may be told out of order or in a manner that does not 
quite make sense.  This could be especially true for a client in a court room 
setting with the judge and jury watching and nerves racing.   
2. Attempting to Withdraw as Counsel and Prejudicial Effects 
Aside from using the flawed narrative approach, a client is further 
prejudiced because the rules of professional conduct require an attorney 
 
135. See id. (describing the “narrative approach”). 
136. See People v. Andrades, 828 N.E.2d 599, 604 (N.Y. 2005) (“[I]f counsel were permitted to 
present defendant’s testimony in narrative form without objection, the very fact of defendant testifying 
in such a manner would signify to the court that counsel believes that his client is perjuring himself.”); 
see also State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Wis. 2004) (“[D]efense counsel may not substitute 
narrative questioning for the traditional question and answer format unless counsel knows that the 
client intends to testify falsely.  Absent the most extraordinary circumstances, such knowledge must be 
based on the client’s expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully.”); United States v. Rantz, 
826 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1988) (justifying defense counsel’s failure to put his client on the stand 
because of the state’s overwhelming evidence, which led counsel to believe that his client’s testimony 
would be false); People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.Y. 2001) (“A lawyer with a perjurious 
client must contend with competing considerations—duties of zealous advocacy, confidentiality and 
loyalty to the client on the one hand, and a responsibility to the courts and our truth-seeking system of 
justice on the other.”). 
137. See Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814 (“The narrative approach has also been criticized as 
communicating to the jury that the defendant is committing perjury.”). 
138. Id. 
139. See id. (“This procedure could hardly have failed to convey to the jury the impression that 
the defendant’s counsel attached little significance or credibility to the testimony of the witness, or that 
the defendant and his counsel were at odds.  Prejudice to the defendant’s case by this trial tactic was 
inevitable.” (quoting State v. Robinson, 224 S.E.2d 174, 180 (N.C. 1976))). 
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attempt to withdraw when his client commits perjury on the stand.140  The 
dramatic effect this has on a client’s case is emphasized in Lowery v. 
Cardwell.141   
In Lowery, the Ninth Circuit correctly highlighted the effect a motion to 
withdraw has on a client when it is done in the midst of trial, especially when 
it is during a bench trial as it was in this case.142  In Lowery, defense counsel 
moved to withdraw from the case when his client testified as to something 
the attorney believed was false.143  Although the attorney was within the 
bounds of the rules in doing so,144 the court stressed the troubling effects 
this has on a client’s case.  Among other things, the motion to withdraw 
clearly communicates to the judge—and potentially the jury if the motion is 
granted—that something has gone terribly wrong between the client and 
attorney.145  This sends a troubling message to the court and greatly reduces 
the chance of a favorable verdict for the defendant.  In effect, a motion to 
withdraw in these circumstances deprives the defendant of a fair trial 
because the court now knows the defendant is not credible.146  The Lowery 
court ultimately held that the attorney’s conduct was proper.147  The court, 
however, plainly stated “this is an unhappy result” because it is inescapable 
though extremely unfavorable.148    
 
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating a lawyer 
must attempt to withdraw if the client insists on an unlawful course of conduct, which clearly includes 
committing perjury). 
141. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[I]f . . . counsel informs the 
fact finder of his belief he has, by that action, disabled the fact finder from judging the merits of the 
defendant’s defense. . . . [and] openly placed himself in opposition to his client upon her defense.  The 
consequences . . . deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”). 
142. See id. (stating a motion to withdraw mid-trial based on a belief of perjury may negate the 
possibility of a fair trial). 
143. Id. at 729. 
144. See id. at 730 (footnote omitted) (“The result on these unusual facts is not inconsistent with 
the principles of professional responsibility under ethical standards as they are generally recognized 
today and does not expose counsel to a charge of subornation of perjury.”). 
145. See supra note 141.  
146. See Lowery, 575 F.2d at 730 (explaining after counsel moved to withdraw and stated he 
could not divulge his reasoning for the motion, “the only conclusion that could rationally be drawn by 
the judge was that in the belief of her counsel appellant had falsely denied shooting the deceased”).  
147. Id. at 730–31. 
148. The court in Lowery reluctantly states: 
Trial counsel is to be commended for his attention to professional responsibility. . . .  We are 
acutely aware of the anomaly presented when mistrial must result from counsel’s bona fide efforts 
to avoid professional irresponsibility.  We find no escape, however, from the conclusion that 
fundamental requisites of fair trial have been irretrievably lost. 
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D. Raising the Competency Standard as an Alternative Solution 
Another alternative solution to this problem would be to refine and raise 
the competency standard for capital punishment defendants in every state 
which implements the death penalty.  Given the fact life or death is at stake, 
as well as the importance of capital defendants receiving a fair trial, it would 
not be unreasonable to raise the competency bar for capital punishment 
defendants.  Many capital punishment defendants are mentally unstable and 
have gone through trauma which has put them on a destructive path.149  
Given that many of these individuals are mentally unstable, on top of the 
implications of a jury verdict in a capital case—not only on the defendant 
but also on the jury’s own conscience—it is not unreasonable to 
categorically and uniformly raise the standard for these limited cases, which 
are of the utmost importance in our justice system.   
The Supreme Court should categorically adopt, for death penalty 
jurisdictions, the competency standard recommended by the ABA.150  This 
 
Id. at 731 (footnote omitted). 
149. See Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental 
Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 791 (2009) (“Indeed, many prisoners on death row, and 
many who have been executed, have suffered from demonstrable mental illness.”); see also Donald P. 
Judges, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Moral Disengagement, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 515, 532 (2004) (“Psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health professionals 
participate in the capital punishment process in several capacities . . . .  [M]ental health professionals’ 
role in the capital punishment process continues to expand, and this expansion has pushed the edges 
of the ethical envelope.”). 
150. Paul M. Igasaki, A.B.A. Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, 
Recommendation No. 122A, at 1–2 (2006).  The ABA’s recommended competency standard is: 
1.  Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, they 
had significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, as 
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental 
retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury. 
2.  Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, they 
had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to 
appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise 
rational judgment in relation to the conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  A disorder manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or 
attributable solely to the acute effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not, 
standing alone, constitute a mental disorder or disability for purposes of this provision. 
3.  Mental Disorder or Disability after Sentencing 
(a) Grounds for Precluding Execution. A sentence of death should not be carried out if the 
prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her capacity (i) to 
make a rational decision to forgo or terminate post-conviction proceedings available to 
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rule is not a novel solution to the dilemma faced by defense attorneys 
dealing with a McCoy defendant.  Justice Powell, in his Ford v. Wainwright151 
concurring opinion, suggested raising the competency standard for capital 
defendants;152 his argument is now even more relevant and carries more 
force than it did when the case was decided in 1986.  Justice Powell 
addressed the issue of competency for execution, stating the Eighth 
Amendment “forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the 
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”153  
Justice Powell suggested the proper test of competency should be whether 
defendants can comprehend the nature, pendency, and purpose of their 
execution.154  Further, he encouraged the states to adopt “a more expansive 
view of sanity,” which included the “requirement that the defendant be able 
to assist in his own defense[,]” stressing the Eighth Amendment 
competency requirement is only a minimum standard.155   
Despite Justice Powell’s encouragement, states have failed to provide 
specific guidelines for evaluating a defendant’s competency for execution.  
This is problematic because a capital punishment trial is extremely intense 
for the defendant and the jury who must decide whether to sentence another 
citizen to death.  Making the decision of whether to send a mentally unstable 
citizen to the death chamber is a decision which must not be taken 
lightly.156  Raising the competency standard in capital punishment trials 
would give deference to the rising issues of mental health in the United 
States.   
 
challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence; (ii) to understand or communicate 
pertinent information, or otherwise assist counsel, in relation to specific claims bearing on 
the validity of the conviction or sentence that cannot be fairly resolved without the 
prisoner’s participation; or (iii) to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or 
to appreciate the reason for its imposition in the prisoner’s own case. 
Id. at 1. 
151. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
152. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). 
153. Id. 
154. See id. (“[O]nly if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can he prepare 
himself for his passing.”). 
155. Id. at 422 n.3. 
156. Cf. Winick, supra note 149, at 789 (“[T]he American Bar Association (“ABA”), the 
American Psychiatric Association (“APsyA”), the American Psychological Association (“APA”), the 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (“NAMI”), and Mental Health America (“MHA”) (formerly known 
as the National Mental Health Association)-—have adopted policy statements that recommend 
prohibiting the execution of those with severe mental illness.”). 
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Mental health has become a topic of conversation in recent years, but the 
courts have not given enough deference to the mental health of capital 
defendants.  While it is true not all capital defendants are incapable of 
understanding the consequences of their actions, it is also true mental 
illnesses account for many heinous crimes.157  Additionally, raising the 
competency standard would not allow defendants to get away with terrible 
crimes.  Instead, this would merely require that when a defendant is mentally 
ill, he must be given a life sentence instead of the death penalty.158  This is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s rulings disallowing execution of a 
mentally retarded defendant.159 
The Supreme Court in McCoy completely failed to address some of these 
tough issues and instead punished the defense counsel by ruling his 
concession of guilt was structural error.160  The McCoy opinion is ill-
founded and makes defense counsel’s already tough moral and ethical 
decisions in capital cases even more difficult.161  When clients, especially in 
the context of capital punishment cases, insist on putting on a frivolous 
defense with no corroborating evidence, defense counsel ought to have the 
authority to make a judgment call on whether they want to continue with 
the representation of their client.162 
 
157. See, e.g., Serious Mental Illnesses and Homicide, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR. (June 2016), 
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/evidence-and-research/learn-more-about/3627 [https:// 
perma.cc/F7LW-UV4H] (“[I]ndividuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are responsible for 
approximately 10% of all homicides in the United States.  For mass killings, the percentage is 
approximately 33% . . . .”). 
158. See, e.g., Jolie McCullough, Texas House OKs Bill to Ban Death Penalty for Those with Severe Mental 
Illness, TEX. TRIB. (May 8, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/08/texas-death-penalty-
rules-could-change-some-mentally-ill-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/4TPD-FAFA] (“For the second 
time in two weeks, the Texas House moved to change death penalty law.  On Wednesday, the chamber 
tentatively passed a measure that would prohibit handing down a death sentence to someone with a 
severe mental illness, like schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.”). 
159. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 149, at 785–86 (footnotes omitted) (“The Court, in effect, 
announced that the Constitution requires a per se finding of diminished responsibility.  All people with 
mental retardation, the Court held, are constitutionally exempt from capital punishment based upon 
their diagnosis alone.”). 
160. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1511 (2018). 
161. See Green, supra note 89, at 533 (“The unusual nature and vulnerability of the clientele—
individuals, many with mental impairments, whose lives are on the line—leads to particular challenges 
of decision-making and counseling.”). 
162. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (affirming an appellate lawyer was not 
required to accede to the defendant’s request to raise particular non-frivolous arguments); see also 
United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92–93 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating a lawyer did not provide ineffective 
assistance in arguing ridiculous theories upon the defendant’s insistence); Nelson v. State, 21 P.3d 55, 
60–61 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (suggesting—although the defendant’s most plausible defense was 
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The Supreme Court in McCoy notes: in some instances a defendant may 
not want to avoid being put to death and instead may “above all else, [want 
to avoid] the opprobrium [attending admission that] he killed family 
members[, o]r he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk 
death for any hope, however small, of exoneration.”163  However, this is 
no excuse for letting a man purposefully walk himself into the government’s 
death chamber and, in effect, commit suicide because he does not want to 
live with the consequences of his actions.  The Supreme Court is essentially 
implying counsel should put aside the fact his client is committing suicide 
because the client may prefer death to prison.164  This reasoning is flawed 
and only worsens a major problem in our justice system.  The United States 
has more people incarcerated than any other country in the world.165  As 
of July 2020, there was an estimated 2,591 inmates on death row.166  With 
the holding in McCoy, the Court only adds fuel to this fire. 
Defense counsel should not be forced to put on a certain outlandish 
defense when there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  More 
importantly, defense counsel should not be forced to ruin their reputation 
with the court, the jury, and the prosecution.  It is likely attorneys will have 
to work together in the future and defense counsel should not be forced to 
raise meritless accusations against peers in the legal community.  Although 
counsel certainly will have to raise some issues because their client insists, 
this does not amount to raising claims against the trial judge, federal, and 
state governments.   




insanity—trial counsel was not ineffective in acceding to the defendant’s decision not to raise the 
defense); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 89–90 (Conn. 1986) (indicating a trial lawyer is not 
constitutionally required to call a witness whom the defendant instructed him to call). 
163. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508. 
164. See id. at 1508–09 (stating an attorney is obligated to uphold the client’s express objective 
of maintaining innocence even in light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary). 
165. Campbell Robertson, Crime Is Down, Yet U.S. Incarceration Rates Are Still Among the Highest in 
the World, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/us-mass-
incarceration-rate.html [https://perma.cc/B4BK-5W66]; Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Total, 
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-
total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/4NPF-8EZQ] (showing a total of 2.1 million 
prisoners incarcerated in the United States; China is the second on the list with 1.7 million incarcerated). 
166. DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. 
SUMMER 2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/DRUSASummer 
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/63RU-AVRB]. 
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not use these recommendations as an excuse to be lazy or not fully litigate 
tough cases.  However, litigating zealously for a client does not mean an 
attorney has to ruin her reputation while doing so.  In situations where there 
is overwhelming evidence against a client, the best way to craft a defense 
may be to concede guilt but focus on mitigation evidence or an insanity 
defense.  This is exactly what English did in McCoy,167 and it was consistent 
with many other cases in Louisiana which allowed the concession even if 
the client objected.168  Additionally, this defense may have worked if it was 
not for McCoy’s testimony to the jury in an unsuccessful attempt to put on 
his conspiracy defense.   
V.    THE LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM THE ABA MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not reflect what the 
Supreme Court now says is required of defense counsel after McCoy.169  The 
Rules do not reflect that a client is in charge of the tactical strategy of 
whether or not to concede guilt during trial as to one element of the charged 
offense.170  Conceding guilt as to an element of the charge is largely a 
tactical decision done when defense counsel believes it will mitigate 
punishment at sentencing.171  This strategy is commonly used when the 
State’s evidence is truly overwhelming.172  In these situations, the best thing 
to do as defense counsel is to focus on mitigation investigation and do 
anything possible to minimize liability at sentencing.173 
  
 
167. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
168. See discussion infra Section VI.A–B.   
169. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see McCoy, 
138 S. Ct. at 1512 (giving criminal defendants the right to insist their attorney not concede guilt as to 
any element of a crime). 
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .  In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by 
the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive 
jury trial and whether the client will testify.”). 
171. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191–92 (2004) (stating it is hopeless in many cases to 
put on a charade before the jury as many triers of fact would prefer candor).  
172. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.  
173. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192 (“In a capital case, counsel must consider in conjunction both the 
guilt and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed.”). 
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A. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Are Silent on the Issue 
of Conceding Guilt 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct reflect that in a criminal 
case the client decides: (1) whether or not to proceed with a jury trial, 
(2) whether to plead guilty, and (3) whether or not to take the stand and 
testify.174  This is the objective/means rule, which essentially states the 
client is in charge of the objective and the attorney the means.175  
Furthermore, the rules make clear that trial strategy is decided by the 
attorney and not the client.176  This is reasonable because it is the attorney 
and not the client who is an experienced advocate.  The rules further reflect 
an attorney may not help his client commit a crime, which clearly includes 
committing perjury.177  Also, an attorney has a duty of candor toward the 
court and has a duty to not pursue and litigate meritless claims.178  In fact, 
an attorney can be disbarred for helping a client commit perjury and not 
being candid with the tribunal.179 
B. Mental Health Issues Are Rampant in the Criminal Justice System 
The Death Penalty Information Center provides that mental health issues 
have a tremendous impact in death penalty cases.180  Actually, “[o]ne in ten 
 
174. See source cited supra note 170. 
175. See W. Bradley Wendel, Autonomy Isn’t Everything: Some Cautionary Notes on McCoy v. 
Louisiana, 9 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 92, 108 (2018) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (“The client may be ‘the master of his or her own defense[,]’ but the lawyer is 
‘captain of the ship.’”). 
176. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“Clients 
normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used 
to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters.”). 
177. Id. at R. 1.16(a)(1), 3.3; see also People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.Y. 2001) (“A 
lawyer with a perjurious client must contend with competing considerations—duties of zealous 
advocacy, confidentiality and loyalty to the client on the one hand, and a responsibility to the courts 
and our truth-seeking system of justice on the other.”). 
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 & 3.3.  But see supra note 162 and 
accompanying text. 
179. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make 
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. . . .  
If . . . the lawyer’s client . . . has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).  
180. Mental Illness, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-
issues/mental-illness [https://perma.cc/XS8C-4F6Z] (discussing the broad impact mental illnesses 
have on a defendant’s criminal case); see also Mental Health and the Death Penalty, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
IN CONTEXT, https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/issues/mentalhealth [https://perma.cc/ 
94N2-ZB8A] (“The defendant’s state of mind is often an issue in death penalty cases because the 
  
172 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:144 
prisoners executed in the United States are ‘volunteers’—defendants or 
prisoners who have waived key trial or appeal rights to” increase their 
chances of execution.181  The Death Penalty Information Center also 
provides that mental illnesses affect defendants’ decisions whether or not to 
represent themselves, their ability to cooperate with attorneys, and even 
influences the jury’s perception of the individual because they must decide 
“whether they pose a future danger to society if” the jury gives a sentence 
of life instead of death.182  Nonetheless, the bar for competency is low, and 
if a defendant is able to communicate with his attorney, he will likely be 
ruled competent to stand trial and be afforded the right to be the master of 
his defense.183  This is extremely problematic because at some point the 
courts must allow defense counsel to do what is best for her client—who 
may be competent to stand trial but clearly incompetent to realize what is in 
his best interest legally and strategically in the context of a capital 
punishment trial.184  
C. The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Capital Cases 
Mental health professionals, especially psychiatrists and psychologists, 
play an increasingly important role in capital punishment cases.185  From 
pretrial competency evaluations to helping restore competence to prepare 
for execution, mental health professionals are heavily involved in the 
process of executing our death row inmates.186  This, of course, is a 
problem because mental health professionals are in the business of 
 
defendant’s mental health affects his or her culpability for the crime, ability to assist counsel, and ability 
to understand the connection between the crime and the punishment imposed.”). 
181. Mental Illness, supra note 180; see also John Blume, Give Me Death, A Lawyer Explains Why His 
Client Volunteered to Be Executed, UTNE READER (Nov.–Dec. 2005), www.utne.com/mind-and-
body/give-me-death-prisoner-volunteers-for-execution [https://perma. cc/JPN8-ZKXE] (describing 
a client who had nothing to live for and essentially volunteered to be executed by waiving key rights). 
182. Mental Illness, supra note 180. 
183. See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 749 (recognizing how a client may be a competent decision 
maker on other issues but may utterly fail to appreciate the severity of the charges and the consequences 
of a proposed objective). 
184. See State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 565 (La. 2016) (discussing the defense attorney’s belief 
he could only save McCoy’s life by conceding guilt); see also supra note 183. 
185. See Judges, supra note 149, at 552 (describing the growing role played by mental health 
professionals in the process surrounding capital punishment). 
186. See id. at 532–33 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (“Mental health professionals . . . 
perform assessment functions in both civil and criminal cases.  In the general criminal arena, the 
services they provide include assessment, consultation, and testimony related to competency to 
waive . . . rights and to stand trial, criminal responsibility (such as the insanity defense and mens rea), 
sentencing, parole, and other dispositional matters.”). 
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providing treatment, not killing.187  In fact, in some cases doctors have 
refused to give treatment to these types of defendants and received serious 
backlash and threats from the government for doing so, including being 
threatened with contempt of court.188  This is quite shocking considering 
doctors are being threatened with contempt for exercising their own rules 
of professional conduct.189  However, it seems clear these professionals are 
crucial to the administration of justice and perform vital roles in our criminal 
justice system.   
The bigger issue is the amount of death row inmates with major mental 
health problems.190  Although these inmates are severely ill, the bar for 
competency is low and if that bar is met, they are eligible for death for 
committing a capital offense.191  While it is true someone must pay when 
these wicked crimes are committed, it is not in the best interest of anyone 
involved to put to death a person who is unable to understand the 
consequences of her actions.192   
The Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright193 prohibited the use of capital 
punishment on an insane defendant in 1986.194  The Court again reiterated 
 
187. See Brian D. Shannon & Victor R. Scarano, Incompetency to Be Executed: Continuing Ethical 
Challenges & Time for a Change in Texas, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 425 (2013) (discussing the 
Hippocratic Oath physicians traditionally take to “do no harm or injustice” to their patients); cf. Judges, 
supra note 149, at 548–49 (providing insight on the ethical dilemmas mental health professionals face 
during various mandatory evaluations of death row inmates). 
188. See Judges, supra note 149, at 549–50 (describing an Arizona doctor who refused to give a 
severely ill defendant psychotics to restore him to competence and was threatened with contempt of 
court from the Arizona Attorney General’s Office). 
189. Id. at 550 (“In other words, the state’s highest legal office actually considered employing 
the legal process to force a physician to violate his own professional ethical code—a code that the state 
would otherwise enforce—and to become an involuntary formal participant in executing a human 
being.”). 
190. See Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with Mental Illnesses, MENTAL HEALTH AM., 
https://www.mhanational.org/issues/position-statement-54-death-penalty-and-people-mental-illness 
es [https://perma.cc/W85Y-GJWZ] (“Although precise statistics are not available, it is estimated that 
at least [twenty] percent of people on death row have a serious mental illness.”); see also FINS, supra 
note 166 (noting the number of prisoners on death row per state). 
191. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) (holding criminal defendants must first be 
ruled competent to stand trial if there are doubts as to whether or not they understand the charges 
brought against them); see also People v. Shrake, 182 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Ill. 1962) (reiterating when there 
is “a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s present sanity” before or during trial, a hearing must be held). 
192. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–20 (2002) (stressing how the imposition of the 
death penalty on a mentally retarded person serves no purpose of our criminal justice system). 
193. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
194. Id. at 417–18. 
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this position in Atkins v. Virginia,195 which explicitly provides the 
imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who is mentally retarded is 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.196  These cases 
demonstrate the delicacy of dealing with defendants like McCoy who are 
completely insane and do not understand the nature of their reality.  These 
defendants do deserve to be punished, but not by death.  Defendants like 
McCoy typically have gone through extreme trauma and abuse and simply 
do not understand what they did was wrong.  Research has shown repeatedly 
that many capital defendants have extremely brutal pasts which involve 
sexual assault, child abuse, drug abuse, verbal and physical abuse, and the 
like.197  These individuals typically were once functioning beings who were 
steered in the wrong direction by a toxic parent, spouse, or significant other.  
Although this does not excuse their behavior, it should be heavily 
considered during competency rulings.  McCoy now gives these troubled 
individuals a constitutional right to insist their attorneys not concede guilt 
as to any element of an offense, even in the face of overwhelming evidence 
which will certainly convince a reasonable jury they are guilty.198 
VI.    MCCOY SHOULD HAVE FALLEN UNDER THE SCOPE OF STRICKLAND 
The Supreme Court, in McCoy, created a new constitutional right for 
capital defendants and disregarded serious mental health issues in the United 
States.199  For English, conceding guilt was the only viable option in the 
 
195. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
196. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–19 (“Unless the imposition of 
the death penalty on a mentally retarded person ‘measurably contributes to one or both of these goals 
[of retribution and deterrence], it ‘is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of 
pain and suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”). 
197. See Childhood Trauma Prevalent Among Death Row Inmates, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/childhood-trauma-prevalent-among-death-row-inmates [https:// 
perma.cc/HHM4-9GSA] (“A majority of Texas death row prisoners who voluntarily responded to a 
recent survey . . . reported having experienced abuse or other trauma as children.  The survey results 
are consistent with the findings of academic studies that have repeatedly documented high rates of 
childhood abuse among those sentenced to death.”). 
198. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1512 (2018) (“Once [McCoy] communicated that 
to court and counsel, strenuously objecting to English’s proposed strategy, a concession of guilt should 
have been off the table.  The trial court’s allowance of English’s admission of McCoy’s guilt despite 
McCoy’s insistent objections was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.”).  
199. See Mental Illness, supra note 180 (describing severely mentally ill capital defendants who are 
sometimes so unaware or ill that they waive key trial or appeal rights and effectively volunteer to be 
executed); see also J.C. Oleson, Swilling Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who Wishes to 
Volunteer for Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147, 154 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“The most 
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face of the State’s evidence.200  Additionally, there were many cases in 
Louisiana at the time that allowed these concessions for capital crimes.201  
All cases were subject to the Strickland test and not viewed under a structural 
error standard.202   
It is critical to understand conceding guilt to an element of an offense 
does not amount to pleading guilty.203  Quite the opposite in fact—take, 
for example, a crime with the following elements: (1) the defendant 
committed the act, and (2) the defendant intended to commit the act.  If 
defense counsel argues his client did commit the act (element 1) but did not 
intend to (element 2), counsel is not saying the client is guilty.204  Counsel 
is admitting the act occurred but is arguing the client is not responsible for 
the outcome because the intent was not present.  This is precisely what 
McCoy’s defense attorney did when he admitted his client killed the victims 
but argued he did not have the mental capacity to be guilty of first-degree 
murder.205 
A. Louisiana Caselaw Views Improper Concessions of Guilt Under the Strickland 
Test 
In State v. Haynes,206 the defendant was found guilty of first-degree 
murder after kidnapping, raping, stabbing, and eventually killing a female 
medical student on campus.207  The evidence in the case was 
overwhelming.208  The State had the defendant on videotape near the 
 
difficult ethical dilemma that faces capital attorneys may be what to do about the ‘volunteer,’ the client 
who wishes to waive his appeals and to expedite his own execution.”). 
200. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
201. See discussion infra Section VI.A–B.  
202. See discussion infra Section VI.A. 
203. See, e.g., McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1518 n.1 (“[Counsel’s] strategy was to concede that McCoy 
committed the murders and to argue that he should be convicted only of second-degree murder, 
because [McCoy’s] ‘mental incapacity prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent to 
commit first degree murder.’” (citing State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 570 (La. 2016))). 
204. See, e.g., id. at 1516–17 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“What about conceding that a defendant is 
guilty, not of the offense charged, but of a lesser included offense?  That is what English did in this 
case.  He admitted that petitioner was guilty of the noncapital offense of second-degree murder in an 
effort to prevent a death sentence.”). 
205. Id. at 1506 n.1. 
206. State v. Haynes, 662 So. 2d 849 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
207. Id. at 850. 
208. See id. at 853 (“The State’s evidence was legally sufficient to prove that Haynes was engaged 
in one or more of the enumerated felonies in the first degree murder statute.”). 
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murder scene shortly before it occurred,209 found the victim’s wallet hidden 
in the defendant’s mobile home,210 and found the victim’s blood in the 
defendant’s automobile.211  Along with other damning evidence in this case, 
it was clear the defendant was guilty.212  In Haynes, defense counsel 
conceded guilt over his client’s objection.213  Haynes did not want to admit 
to any accusations made by the State and made this clear to the court.214  
However, his defense attorney, knowing this strategy would surely lead to 
the death penalty, conceded guilt to second-degree murder but argued his 
client did not possess the intent needed for first.215 
The Fifth Circuit ultimately upheld the lower court’s determination and 
properly considered the case under Strickland.216  In doing so, the appellate 
court held the State’s evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict 
for first-degree murder.217  The court considered the totality of the 
evidence and logically concluded: even if the concession was improper, it 
did not amount to any prejudice because it was not relied on by the State 
and the State had plenty of evidence to support the verdict.218  In the end, 
the concession was successful because the jury did not agree on a capital 
 
209. See id. at 851 (“The medical school’s video surveillance system recorded Haynes on 
videotape on the ninth floor of the BRI building around the time in question. . . .  Haynes’s grandfather, 
who was also his supervisor, identified him from the tape.”). 
210. Id. 
211. See id. at 851 (indicating scientific tests confirmed Haynes was the victim’s rapist.). 
212. See id. at 853 (“Based on the totality of the evidence, a reasonable juror could have 
concluded that Haynes had committed the aggravated kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery of [the 
victim].”). 
213. See id. at 850 (“[H]aynes complains of his counsel’s above argument, which was effectively 
stated in his counsel’s opening remarks to the jury, conceding Haynes’s guilt of the underlying felonies 
relied on by the State for a conviction of first degree felony murder.”). 
214. See id. at 852 (“Haynes specifically asserts that he did not want his lawyers to argue that he 
was guilty of any of the accusations made by the State.”). 
215. See id. at 850 (“Haynes’s counsel argues here . . . that while the evidence may show that 
Haynes kidnapped, raped, robbed and cut and stabbed [the victim] with a knife, the evidence does not 
negate the reasonable inference of four arguable ways that [the victim] could have fallen to her death 
after the other felonies were committed.”). 
216. See id. at 853 (“Where the assertion that counsel was ineffective rests on actions of counsel 
pertaining to the incident proceedings, the Strickland test is applicable.”). 
217. Id.  
218. See id. (“Here counsel’s strategy was to persuade the jury against a capital verdict in the 
bifurcated proceedings.  The State did not rely on defense counsel’s concessions.  The State’s evidence 
was legally sufficient to prove that Haynes was engaged in one or more of the enumerated 
felonies . . . .”). 
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verdict and instead sentenced the defendant to life without parole.219  
Haynes gives Louisiana the general rule of using the Strickland ineffective 
assistance of counsel test when dealing with an attorney who admits guilt 
over client objection.220 
B. Other Capital Cases in Louisiana Allowed Defense Counsel to Concede Guilt 
Over Client Objection 
In four other capital cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court permitted 
defense counsel to concede their clients’ guilt over an express objection and 
used the Strickland test if ineffective assistance of counsel was raised.221  
First, in State v. Tucker,222 the defendant was forced to proceed with his 
attorney who, over his objection, admitted his guilt to first-degree murder 
while arguing for a lesser sentence.223  Next, in State v. Leger,224 the 
defendant was given the choice to accept his attorney’s strategy—admit guilt 
over his objection—or represent himself.225  Also, in State v. Bridgewater,226 
the defendant, who insisted his attorney fight for acquittal, was eventually 
told he must accept the strategy of conceding guilt to second-degree 
murder.227  Lastly, in State v. Tyler,228 the defendant was forced to proceed 
with his trial counsel admitting guilt over his objection.229 
Whether right or wrong, English’s strategy to concede guilt over McCoy’s 
objection was not novel in the legal field, especially not in Louisiana, where 
this was typically the practice when there was overwhelming evidence of 
 
219. See id. (“Whatever the reasons for the jury’s inability to agree on a capital verdict, Haynes’s 
counsel succeeded in avoiding the death sentence.”). 
220. Brief for The Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and The Promise of 
Justice Initiative as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15–16, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct 1500 
(2018) (No. 16-8255) [hereinafter Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana]. 
221. Id. at 16–17. 
222. State v. Tucker, 181 So. 3d 590 (La. 2015). 
223. See id. at 620–21 (“Defendant alleges he did not acquiesce in the decision of defense 
counsel to admit guilt of second degree murder and feticide in closing.”); see also Amicus Brief, McCoy 
v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 16 (providing details regarding the facts of State v. Tucker). 
224. State v. Leger, 936 So. 2d 108 (La. 2006). 
225. Id. at 148–50; see also Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 16 (providing 
details regarding the facts of State v. Leger).  
226. State v. Bridgewater, 823 So. 2d 877 (La. 2002).  
227. Id. at 895–96; see also Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 17 (providing 
details regarding the facts of State v. Bridgewater).  
228. State v. Tyler, 181 So. 3d 678 (La. 2015). 
229. See Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 17 (providing details regarding 
the facts of State v. Tyler).  See generally Tyler, 181 So. 3d 678; Tyler v. Louisiana, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016) 
(cert. denied). 
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guilt.  Although it seems counterintuitive, admitting guilt as to an element 
of a crime can sometimes be the best way to minimize liability in the face of 
overwhelming evidence.230  It can also serve as an essential strategic choice 
in a bench trial if the judge is known to be more lenient when a defendant 
admits his fault.  If the Supreme Court believed the concession of guilt by 
English was improper, they should have analyzed it under the scope of 
Strickland to determine whether the concession prejudiced McCoy to the 
extent where a new trial was necessary.231 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, in McCoy v. Louisiana, had an opportunity to consider 
heavily litigated and controversial issues, such as the right to withdraw when 
the client is going to commit perjury, the duty of candor toward the tribunal, 
the issue of competency, and client autonomy.232  The Court failed to do 
so, despite the tremendous importance of these issues.  Admittedly, some 
of these issues need to be considered by the ABA and by individual states, 
but the Court failed to remand the case and instead created poor law with 
the most extreme facts.233 
The Supreme Court erred in holding a client may insist her attorney not 
concede guilt as to any element of a crime in the face of overwhelming 
evidence.234  Although the client has the right to be the master of her own 
defense,235 at some point this must give way to a seasoned attorney’s 
professional judgment on what is best for the client’s legal interests.236  
Especially in capital trials, defense attorneys should be given maximum 
deference in trial strategy decisions.237  In any event, conceding guilt in the 
face of overwhelming evidence should not amount to structural error.  
Instead, the Supreme Court should have used a standard similar to the one 
 
230. See United States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d 202, 227 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2011) (citation 
omitted) (“[T]here was a risk that jurors presented with an initial denial of guilt would view skeptically 
any later attempt to claim acceptance of responsibility or remorse.  Therefore, a plea of not guilty could 
have significantly undermined two of the most important mitigating factors available to Sampson.”); 
see also In re Pers. Restraint of Elmore, 172 P.3d 335, 346 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (“[Counsel’s] advice 
to plead guilty [to a capital crime] was based upon reasonable trial strategy.”). 
231. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
232. See generally McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
233. Id. 
234. See discussion supra Section VI.B. 
235. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
237. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
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in Strickland and analyzed whether or not the client was prejudiced by his 
attorney’s concession or trial strategy.238 
 
238. See discussion supra Part VI. 
